Hon. John C. Coughenour

1

2 Presented to the Court by the foreman of the
   Grand Jury in open Court, in the presence of
3 the Grand Jury and FILED in the U.S.
   DISTRICT COURT at Seattle, Washington.

4

5 _MAY 19_ 20_11_
   WILLIAM M. McCOOL, Clerk

6 By _____ Deputy

7   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                       WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
8   AT SEATTLE

9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,   )
)   NO. CR10-0078JCC
           Plaintiff,   )
10   )
)   SUPERSEDING
              v.   )   INDICTMENT
11   )
   DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA,   )
12   aka Eraflame,   )
        aka Dima-k17,   )
13   aka DDService, and   )
)
14 SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV,   )
        aka Jjoker,   )
15   Defendants.   )
   _____)

16

17 The Grand Jury charges that:

18   **COUNT 1**

19   **(Conspiracy to Intentionally Cause Damage
               Without Authorization to a Protected Computer)**

20 A.   **The Offense**

21   1.   Beginning at a time uncertain, but beginning no later than June 6, 2008, and

22 continuing until on or about August 15, 2008, within the Western District of

23 Washington and elsewhere, DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA, aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17,

24 aka DDService, and SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV, aka Jjoker,

25 did knowingly and willfully conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together with others,

26 known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit offenses against the United States, to wit:

27 intentionally causing damage to a protected computer, in violation of

28

SUP. INDICTMENT/Zubakha, D., and Logashov, S. - 1
USAO # 2008R00966

1 Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), 1030(b), and 1030(c)(4)(A), and

2 committed acts in furtherance of that conspiracy.

3 **B.   Background**

4   At all times material herein,

5   1.   Amazon.com is a world leader in the online retailing of consumer products.

6 Amazon.com operates retail websites, including www.amazon.com, and offers programs that

7 enable third parties to sell products on its websites. Amazon.com earns revenues in a number of

8 ways, including through retail sales of goods through its websites and by charging fees to sellers

9 who list goods for sale on the Amazon.com websites. Amazon.com is headquartered in Seattle,

10 WA. Amazon.com's business model relies upon online commerce, and the success of that

11 model depends upon the ability of its customers to access its websites and conduct transactions

12 on those websites quickly, reliably, and securely. The content on Amazon.com's websites is

13 provided and supported by a network of server computers, ("webservers"), which computers are

14 used in interstate and foreign commerce and communication.

15   2.   EBay is a major online commercial and auction business, which describes itself as

16 "the worlds' largest online marketplace." Headquartered in San Jose, CA, eBay serves 90

17 million online users, worldwide, who access the eBay website to post items for sale or auction, or

18 who access the eBay website to purchase the items posted there for sale or auction. Ebay earns

19 revenues by charging a small fee for the transactions that take place through their website.

20 EBay's business model relies upon online commerce, and the success of that model depends

21 upon the ability of its customers to access its website and conduct transactions on that website

22 quickly, reliably, and securely. The content on cBay's website is provided and supported by a

23 network of server computers, (webservers), which computers are used in interstate and foreign

24 commerce and communication.

25   3.   Priceline.com is a major online travel-related business, headquartered in Norwalk,

26 CN. Through its website, Priceline.com provides consumers with the ability

27 to purchase airline tickets or cruise or vacation packages, or make hotel or car reservations.

28 Priceline.com earns revenues by keeping a small percentage of the cost, or charging a small

SUP. INDICTMENT/Zubakha, D., and Logashov, S. - 2
USAO # 2008R00966

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101-1271
(206) 553-7970

1 handling fee, for transactions that take place through their website.   Priceline.com's business

2 model relies upon online commerce, and the success of that model depends upon the ability of its

3 customers to access its website and conduct transactions on that website quickly, reliably, and

4 securely. The content on Priceline.com's website is provided and supported by a network of

5 server computers, (webservers), which computers are used in interstate and foreign commerce

6 and communication.

7   4.   DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA is an individual residing in Moscow,

8 Russia.

9   5.   SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV is an individual residing in Moscow,

10 Russia.

11   **Internet Websites and the Webservers that Host Them**

12   6.   Websites contain information (data) that is available to computer users via the

13 Internet and the world wide web. The information (data) that appears to a user who accesses a

14 website is stored on a specialized type of computer, called a webserver. When a request to view

15 a website, or a webpage within that site, is received by a webserver, the webserver compiles and

16 transmits the appropriate data, in a user friendly form, back to the computer (and user) who made

17 that particular request.

18   7.   The demand placed on a webserver to respond to a request can vary, according to

19 the type of data or service requested. A response to a request for a webpage that contains only

20 text, for example, can be transmitted relatively easily and quickly. If a request is made for a

21 webpage with a large number of graphic images, however, the webserver must compile, process

22 and transmit much more data. The requisite data components may, in fact, be stored on many

23 different webservers. As a result, requests for these webpages place a much greater burden on,

24 and usurp a larger share of a webserver's capacity.

25   8.   Companies with high volume traffic websites often require a large number of

26 webservers to fully and reliably respond to requests made by visitors to view graphic webpages,

27 and to conduct interactive transactions through their websites. These webservers may be located

28

1   in multiple geographic locations, but are networked to provide cohesive support to the company

2   website and reliably provide the level of services normally requested through it.

3   **Internet Protocol Addresses and Proxy Servers**

4   9.   Computers that are connected to the Internet need to be able to "find" one another

5   in order to communicate. **"Internet Protocol addresses" ("IP addresses")** serve this function.

6   Every computer connected to the Internet is assigned a unique 32-bit IP address, that consists of

7   four sets of from one to three digits separated by a period. Data that accompanies an Internet

8   communication will typically include the destination, as well as the originating IP address. The

9   originating IP address can in turn be used to identify the source of the particular communication.

10   10.   A **proxy server** is a computer or server computer that acts as a proxy

11   (intermediary) in the transmission of Internet communications. Proxy servers can therefore be

12   used to conceal the true originating IP address - and therefore the source - of a communication

13   made over the Internet. For example, an individual who wants to conceal his originating IP

14   address can route his communication to and through a proxy server - or even through a

15   succession of proxy servers - on route to the final destination. Data identifying the originating IP

16   address of the communication will be replaced with data that instead identifies the IP address of

17   the proxy server/s through which the communication was routed. As a result, it may then be

18   impossible to identify the true source of that Internet communication.

19   **Other Terminology Relating to Computer Attacks and Attackers**

20   11.   **Bot Computer.** A "bot" ("robot') computer is a computer that has been infected

21   with some kind of (typically malicious) software or code and is thereafter

22   subject to control by someone other than the true owner. The true owner of the

23   computer may not even be aware of the bot infection, because he may remain able to use the

24   computer as he did before it was infected, (although speed or performance may be

25   compromised). At the same time, however, the bot controller may also be using the infected bot

26   computer for malicious purposes - to commit Distributed Denial of Service ("DDoS") attacks,

27   send spam e-mail, or function as a proxy server, without the true computer owner's knowledge or

28   consent.

SUP. INDICTMENT/Zubakha, D., and Logashov, S. - 4
USAO # 2008R00966

1   12.   **Botnet**. A "botnet" is a network of bot computers. The computers are harnessed

2   and can be used en masse, in a coordinated fashion, to deliver Internet-based attacks, including

3   DDoS attacks, to transmit spam, or as networks of proxy servers.

4   13.   **Distributed Denial of Service ("DDoS") Attack.** DDoS attacks are malicious

5   attacks against websites, made in ways that are intended to overwhelm the capacities of a

6   webserver to process legitimate Internet traffic. As a result, visitors and would-be customers of

7   the website and its sponsoring business are "denied service" - and are consequently unable to

8   place orders for merchandise or conduct other types of transactions through the affected website

9   during the pendency of the attack. For companies who conduct a large volume of business

10 online, the financial impact of a DDoS attack can be severe.

11 14.   Malicious computer attackers ("hackers") have developed a variety of DDoS

12 attack methods, of varying levels of severity and sophistication. Many of these methodologies

13 involve botnets. One or more botnets can be used, for example, to send extraordinary volumes of

14 traffic to website servers, so that all of the available webserver capacity is consumed simply in

15 receiving the traffic. Another method of attack is to use botnets to transmit an extraordinary

16 volume of requests for information from the webservers, so that the servers become

17 overwhelmed in processing the responses to those data requests. Whatever the methodology,

18 services to legitimate website visitors and would-be customers can be impaired or even

19 completely denied by such an attack, until such time as the victim entity can defeat the attack and

20 restore its webservers and systems to normal operations. This may take minutes, hours, or

21 sometimes even days.

22 15.   Hackers launch DDoS attacks for a variety of reasons. In some cases, they wage

23 DDoS attacks against prominent online commercial targets simply to build and promote their

24 reputations as hackers, with a goal of then "renting" botnets or marketing their DDoS expertise

25 and hacking services to others. Hackers sometimes launch DDoS attacks against other hackers,

26 or hacker groups, for like reasons - to promote their reputations - or, as part of a feud, or to seek

27 revenge against other hackers or hacker groups. Hackers also commonly DDoS online

28 commercial companies to extort them, based on the premise that it will be "cheaper" for a

SUP. INDICTMENT/Zubakha, D., and Logashov, S. - 5
USAO # 2008R00966

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101-1271
(206) 553-7970

1 company to meet an extortion demand than to suffer the losses both to sales and to reputation

2 that could result from a "successful" and lengthy DDoS attack. In such cases, the victim

3 company typically will receive a communication - by e-mail or by telephone - after an attack has

4 begun, with an offer for "technical" or "IT assistance" in solving the DDoS problem that the

5 company is experiencing.

6   16.   **Hacking Forums**. Hacker forums are websites, typically accessible only to

7 members, that are devoted to topics related to hacking. Hackers can visit these sites and

8 communicate with others sharing these mutual interests. The hacking forums typically include

9 various "pages" where members of the forum can post and answer questions on botnets, DDoS

10 attacks, and other hacking-related issues. Hackers can also post advertisements for hacking

11 services, along with the prices for the same.

12   17.   **Online Nicknames ("Nics")**. Hackers typically are identified in their

13 communications by their online "nic" (nickname or screen name). A hacker's

14 reputation (or "street cred") within the hacking community and on hacking forums is linked to

15 his nic. The history of that nic can help hackers communicate and build trust with each other.

16 Consequently, a hacker's "nic" is currency that is highly valued and zealously protected.

17 Some hackers will use multiple nics or alias names in order to engage in conduct or make

18 statements within the hacking community that they want to appear as coming from others. For

19 example, a hacker may use one nic, within a hacking forum, to praise

20 the malicious services that he is advertising for sale, under another of his nics.

21 **C.   Object and Purpose of the Conspiracy**

22   18.   The object of the conspiracy was to launch DDoS attacks against major online

23 retail companies, by using botnets to transmit particular types of commands to

24 the webservers of those companies, in artificially high volumes, with the intention of impairing

25 or destroying the ability of those webservers to provide data and normal

26 online retail services to the companies' customers. DMITRY OLEGOVICH

27 ZUBAKHA, aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and SERGEY VIKTOROVICH

28 LOGASHOV, aka Jjoker, intended by these DDoS attacks to build

SUP. INDICTMENT/Zubakha, D., and Logashov, S. - 6
USAO # 2008R00966

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101-1271
(206) 553-7970

1 and enhance their reputation as hackers; to extort, or attempt to extort money from the online

2 companies they victimized; and/or to gain financially in other ways, such as through the sale of

3 their hacking services.

4 **D.   Manner and Means of the Conspiracy**

5   19.   It was part of the conspiracy that DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA,

6 aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV, aka

7 Jjoker, conspired and agreed to launch DDoS attacks against the websites of prominent online

8 retail companies, including Amazon.com, eBay, and Priceline.com, beginning no later than June

9 6, 2008, and continuing through July 21, 2008.

10   20.   It was further part of the conspiracy that DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA,

11 aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV, aka

12 Jjoker, made preliminary visits to, and reconnoitered the websites that they targeted for DDoS

13 attacks, and when doing so, utilized proxy servers to conceal their true originating IP addresses,

14 and thus the true origin of those communications.

15   21.   It was further part of the conspiracy that DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA, aka

16 Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV, aka

17 Jjoker, themselves created, and/or otherwise gained access to botnets, in order to launch the

18 agreed-upon DDoS attacks against their targeted online victim companies.

19   22.   It was further part of the conspiracy that DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA,

20 aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV, aka

21 Jjoker, issued commands to the bots they used for their DDoS attacks, to make requests, through

22 the websites and webservers of their targeted online victim companies, to display webpages that

23 contained particularly large numbers of graphic or picture files, because requests of that type

24 would place extraordinary burdens on the targeted webservers. DMITRY OLEGOVICH

25 ZUBAKHA, aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and SERGEY VIKTOROVICH

26 LOGASHOV, aka Jjoker, knew and intended that the massive burdens they thus placed on the

27 targeted webservers would consequently impair the ability of those computers to provide data to,

28

SUP. INDICTMENT/Zubakha, D., and Logashov, S. - 7
USAO # 2008R00966

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101-1271
(206) 553-7970

1   and support commercial transactions by and with would-be online customers of the targeted

2   companies.

3   23.   It was further part of the conspiracy that DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA,

4   aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV, aka

5   Jjoker, did launch DDoS attacks of the type described above against Amazon.com on or about

6   June 6, and again on June 9, 2008; against eBay on or about June 6, 2008; and against

7   Priceline.com on or about July 21, 2008.

8   24.   It was further part of the conspiracy that DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA,

9   aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, periodically visited and made communications to

10 and in online hacker forums, during the period from at least June 6, 2008, to and until August 15,

11 2008, in which he acknowledged and confirmed his involvement in hacking activities, posted

12 credit card numbers obtained from hacking attacks, offered malicious botnets for rent, and

13 otherwise promoted himself and his expertise as an accomplished hacker for the purpose of

14 marketing his malicous hacking services.

15   25.   It was further part of the conspiracy that after initiating the DDoS attack

16 on Priceline.com, on July 21, 2008, DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA, aka

17 Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and SERGEY VIKTOROVICH

18 LOGASHOV, aka Jjoker, placed a telephone call to Priceline.com; stated that the

19 phone call was from "Sergey"; and stated further that "Sergey" was an "information technology

20 consultant" who was willing to "assist them" with their "network

21 problems."

22 **E.   Overt Acts**

23   26.   In furtherance of the conspiracy and to achieve the objects thereof, at least one of

24 the coconspirators committed or caused to be committed, in the Western District

25 of Washington, and elsewhere, at least one of the following overt acts, among others:

26   27.   On or about June 6, 2008, at about 10:23 a.m. (PST), DMITRY OLEGOVICH

27 ZUBAKHA, aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and

28

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101-1271
(206) 553-7970

1 SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV, aka Jjoker, launched a DDoS attack against the

2 website and webservers of Amazon.com, that continued until Amazon.com was able to

3 successfully mitigate the attack at around 2:55 p.m. (PST) on June 6, 2008. During

4 the attack, the bots involved in the attack requested large and resource intensive

5 webpages on a magnitude of 600% to 1000% of normal traffic levels. As a result, Amazon.com

6 webservers were overwhelmed, and legitimate customers were unable to access the website and

7 complete their e-commerce transactions during the pendency of the attack. Amazon.com

8 suffered financial losses exceeding $5,000.00 as a result.

9   28.   On or about June 9, 2008, at about 10:06 a.m. (PST), DMITRY OLEGOVICH

10 ZUBAKHA, aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and

11 SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV, aka Jjoker, launched a DDoS attack against the

12 website and webservers of Amazon.com, that continued at some level until Amazon.com was

13 able to finally and fully mitigate the attack on June 12, 2008. During the attack, the bots

14 involved in the attack requested large and resource intensive webpages, overwhelming

15 Amazon.com webservers. Orders from Amazon.com customers dropped significantly, as

16 legitimate customers were unable to access the website and complete their e-commerce

17 transactions during the pendency of the attack. Amazon.com suffered financial losses exceeding

18 $5,000.00 as a result.

19   29.   On or about June 10, 2008, DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA, aka Eraflame,

20 aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, under the nic, "Eraflame," acknowledged and confirmed in

21 communications made in a hacker forum that he was behind the DDoS attacks on Amazon.com.

22   All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

23

24   **COUNT 2**

25 **(Intentionally Causing and Attempting to Cause Damage to a Protected Computer
   and Thereby Causing Loss in Excess of $5,000)**

26

27   On or about June 6, 2008, within the Western District of Washington and elsewhere,

28 DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA, aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and

SUP. INDICTMENT/Zubakha, D., and Logashov, S. - 9
USAO # 2008R00966

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101-1271
(206) 553-7970

SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV, aka Jjoker, knowingly caused and attempted to cause

the transmission of a program, information, code, and command, and as a result of that conduct,

intentionally caused and attempted to cause damage, without authorization, to webserver

computers belonging to, and used in interstate commerce and communications by Amazon.com,

and by such conduct caused an aggregate loss to Amazon.com of at least $5,000 in value during a

one-year period.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), 1030(b),

1030(c)(4)(A), and 2.

COUNT 3

**(Intentionally Causing and Attempting to Cause Damage to a Protected Computer
and Thereby Causing Loss in Excess of $5,000)**

On or about June 9, 2008, within the Western District of Washington and elsewhere,

DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA, aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, and

SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LOGASHOV, aka Jjoker, knowingly caused and attempted to cause

the transmission of a program, information, code, and command, and as a result of that conduct,

intentionally caused and attempted to cause damage, without authorization, to webserver

computers belonging to, and used in interstate commerce and communications by Amazon.com,

and by such conduct caused an aggregate loss to Amazon.com of at least $5,000 in value during a

one-year period.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), 1030(b),

1030(c)(4)(A), and 2.

COUNT 4

(Possession of Fifteen or More Unauthorized Access Devices)

On or about October 12, 2009, within the Western District of Washington and elsewhere,

DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA, aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, knowingly

and with intent to defraud, possessed and attempted to possess fifteen or more unauthorized

SUP. INDICTMENT/Zubakha, D., and Logashov, S. - 10
USAO # 2008R00966

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101-1271
(206) 553-7970

1 | access devices, and by such conduct affected interstate and foreign commerce, in that, on that

2 | date, DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA, aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService,

3 | possessed credit card track data for over 28,000 credit cards, which included credit card account

4 | numbers for accounts that were established through and issued by the Boeing Employees Credit

5 | Union, in the Western District of Washington, and which credit card account numbers were used

6 | to make fraudulent purchases in locations outside the State of Washington, and outside the

7 | United States.

8 | All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1029(a)(3), 1029(b)(1), and

9 | 1029(c)(1)(A)(i).

10 |

11 |

12 | /

13 | /

14 | /

15 | /

16 | /

17 | /

18 | /

19 | /

20 | /

21 | /

22 | /

23 | /

24 | /

25 | /

26 | /

27 | /

28 | /

COUNT 5

(Aggravated Identity Theft)

On or about October 12, 2009, within the Western District of Washington and elsewhere, DMITRY OLEGOVICH ZUBAKHA, aka Eraflame, aka Dima-k17, aka DDService, knowingly transferred, possessed and used, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person, to wit, the personally identifiable credit card number ****-****-****-9668, belonging to K.A. of Lake Stevens, WA, within the Western District of Washington, during and in relation to a felony listed in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(c), to wit, Access Device Fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1029.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1).

A TRUE BILL:

DATED: May 19, 2011

Signature of the Foreperson redacted pursuant to the policy of the Judicial Conference

_____
FOREPERSON

_____
JENNY A. DURKAN
United States Attorney

_____
CARL BLACKSTONE
Assistant United States Attorney

_____
KATHRYN A. WARMA
Assistant United States Attorney

SUP. INDICTMENT/Zubakha, D., and Logashov, S. - 12
USAO # 2008R00966

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101-1271
(206) 553-7970